> 2025-08-11 NVIDIA reiterated the request to postpone disclosure until mid-January 2026.
> 2025-08-12 Quarkslab replied that the bugs were first reported in June 18th and mid-January was well past the standard 90 day normally agreed for coordinated disclosure and that we did not see a rationale for postponing publication by, at a minimum, 3 months. Therefore Quarkslab continued with the publication deadline set to September 23rd 2025 and offered to extend the deadline an additional 30 days provided NVIDIA gave us some insights about the full scope of affected products and if the fixes are to be released as a stand alone security fix, as opposed to rolled into a version bump that includes other code changes.
Richest corporation in the world needs 7 months to remedy? Why not 4 years?
> Back in 2022, NVIDIA started distributing the Linux Open GPU Kernel Modules. Since 2024, using these modules is officially "the right move" for both consumer and server hardware. The driver provides multiple kernel modules, the bugs being found in nvidia.ko and nvidia-uvm.ko. They expose ioctls on device files, most of them being accessible to unprivileged users. These ioctls are meant to be used by NVIDIA's proprietary userland binaries and libraries. However, using the header files provided in the kernel modules repository as a basis, it's possible to make direct ioctl calls.
If only there were some way to release the source code for your userland programs so that the computing public could look at the code, then offer a fix for a bug such as this.
Unfortunately, so far as I'm aware, there is no way to do this and having a few people who are working against what has to be a large number of deadlines look at extremely low-level code for very sophisticated software is the only way forward for these things.
> If only there were some way to release the source code for your userland programs so that the computing public could look at the code, then offer a fix for a bug such as this.
These bugs are in the already open sourced kernel modules, the userland components are largely irrelevant as long as an attacker can just do invoke the affected ioctl directly.
Check out the disclosure timeline.
> 2025-08-11 NVIDIA reiterated the request to postpone disclosure until mid-January 2026.
> 2025-08-12 Quarkslab replied that the bugs were first reported in June 18th and mid-January was well past the standard 90 day normally agreed for coordinated disclosure and that we did not see a rationale for postponing publication by, at a minimum, 3 months. Therefore Quarkslab continued with the publication deadline set to September 23rd 2025 and offered to extend the deadline an additional 30 days provided NVIDIA gave us some insights about the full scope of affected products and if the fixes are to be released as a stand alone security fix, as opposed to rolled into a version bump that includes other code changes.
Richest corporation in the world needs 7 months to remedy? Why not 4 years?
> Richest corporation in the world
At least until the SEC starts punishing revenue inflation through self-dealing.
> Why not 4 years?
Microsoft might hold a patent on this.
And the latest driver available for Jetson Thor doesn't have the fixes for these two CVEs because they decided to fork their own driver...
> Back in 2022, NVIDIA started distributing the Linux Open GPU Kernel Modules. Since 2024, using these modules is officially "the right move" for both consumer and server hardware. The driver provides multiple kernel modules, the bugs being found in nvidia.ko and nvidia-uvm.ko. They expose ioctls on device files, most of them being accessible to unprivileged users. These ioctls are meant to be used by NVIDIA's proprietary userland binaries and libraries. However, using the header files provided in the kernel modules repository as a basis, it's possible to make direct ioctl calls.
If only there were some way to release the source code for your userland programs so that the computing public could look at the code, then offer a fix for a bug such as this.
Unfortunately, so far as I'm aware, there is no way to do this and having a few people who are working against what has to be a large number of deadlines look at extremely low-level code for very sophisticated software is the only way forward for these things.
> If only there were some way to release the source code for your userland programs so that the computing public could look at the code, then offer a fix for a bug such as this.
These bugs are in the already open sourced kernel modules, the userland components are largely irrelevant as long as an attacker can just do invoke the affected ioctl directly.
To parody the evergreen The Onion headline
"No way to prevent this" says proprietary codebases where this always happens